Instinct vs. Reflection: What are the Hidden Costs of Second-Order Desires?

Have you ever looked over to your pet and thought, “I wish I were you?” If you were your pet you wouldn't have to worry about how things should be or reflect on every thought and action you take. You would just do. In the terms of philosopher Harry Frankfurt, pets are wantons–beings who act on their first-order desires without any reflection or thought (Frankfurt 1971, 11). He says that what separates us people from wantons is our second-order desires and volitions, which are the ability to reflect on our wants (Frankfurt 11). To him, having free will relies on having second-order volitions (Frankfurt 15). While second-order desires may seem like the key to freedom, they create inner conflict and prevent us from being our true selves. Further investigation can conclude that freedom does not belong to the reflective person, but to the wanton who lives free from the control of second-order desires and the burden of responsibility. 

Before deciding whether being a wanton or a person is better, it's important to understand what Frankfurt is saying in his article “Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person," where he draws a distinction between two kinds of desires. First-order desires are simple wants, like wanting to eat a cookie or wanting to go for a walk (Frankfurt 7). On the other hand, second-order desire is the desire to want something, such as the desire to want to eat healthy (Frankfurt 7). Connected to the second-order desire is the second-order volition, which allows us to reflect on our wants and analyze our thoughts (Frankfurt 10). According to Frankfurt, this ability to reflect on your desires is what gives someone free will (Frankfurt 15). Frankfurt himself writes, “...the statement that a person enjoys freedom of the will means (also roughly) that he is free to want what he wants to want. More precisely, it means that he is free to will what he wants to will, or to have the will he wants (Frankfurt 15).” In other words, he is saying that to have free will, you have to have the ability to want to want and think about your first-order desires, which is the definition of second-order desires and volitions.  

Not every being has this ability to reflect on one's thoughts, and these beings who don't are called wantons. According to Frankfurt, wantons only have first-order desires and don't think of whether they should or should not do something (Frankfurt 11). He also believes these beings can't be free because they lack the second-order volition that's required in his free will definition (Frankfurt 15). However, this idea of freedom implies that self-reflection leads to the true self. The second-order desire creates self-conflict and doesn't allow for your true thoughts and instincts to come out.

When you have first-order desires, they come from pure instinct and first thought. In other words, they are truly you and what you want. When you use your second-order volition, you reflect on your first-order and whether you really want it or not. However, this reflection and second-guessing doesn't come from you, and to explain this I want to bring attention to Galen Strawson’s “The Impossibility of Moral Responsibility”. In his essay, he brings up a point that cannot be ignored when presenting the basic argument. He explains that for someone to be responsible for their actions, they need to be responsible for the way they are in terms of “preferences, values, pro-attitudes, ideals,” etc (Strawson 6). However, choosing who you are would be impossible because you would have to select those traits and values, and they come from things outside of your control. Things like birthplace, parents, and upbringing can't be chosen by you and make up your preferences and values.  He states, “...to be truly responsible, on account of having chosen to be the way one is, mentally speaking, in certain respects, one must be truly responsible for one’s having the principles of choice P1 in the light of which one chose how to be. But for this to be so one must have chosen P1… but for this, i.e (7), to be so one must already have some principles of choice P2, in light of which one chose P1. And so on. Here we are setting out on a regress that we cannot stop (Strawson 6-7)”.  In short, he is saying that for you to choose your preferences and values, another you would have to choose those preferences and values, and then another and another endlessly. Since this infinite cycle is not possible, he concludes that moral responsibility–which is connected to free will–is impossible (Strawson 7). 

Using Strawson’s logic, we can make important conclusions about second-order volitions and where they come from. It is safe to assume that Strawson would say that second-order volitions come from things that are not in your control. Unlike first-order desires, second-order desires and volitions are thoughts that come from outside factors, such as your hometown and upbringing. For example, let's say you have the first order desire to go for a walk in the park, but when growing up you were told that walking in parks is dangerous and bad. This desire would activate your second-order volition and reflect on your first-order desire. It would create an inner conflict and try to suppress your first-order desire because of how you grew up. This internal conflict caused by your second-order violation makes it harder for you to be yourself and act on your free will. According to Strawson’s reasoning, since we can't be the cause of factors that shape our personality, we can't be truly responsible for them. Therefore, the person with second-order volitions may not be as free as they think. Now imagine the same situation but with a wanton. Even with an upbringing that taught the wanton that parks are dangerous, it would still go to the park because it wants to satisfy its first-order desire. Doesn't that sound more like an exercise of free will than letting outside sources control your wants? The wanton acts from pure desire that hasn't been shaped by outside fear or social expectation. Its actions come from within and are the ultimate form of free will. 

While some might argue that the wanton lacks freedom because it doesn't reflect on its actions, Strawson's argument reveals that the reflection isn't truly yours. If our second-order desires and volitions are shaped by forces out of our control, then the reflection only gives us the feeling of freedom and not freedom itself. Frankfurt's idea of a person may seem more freeing and self-aware, but that awareness is built on self-conflict and values that aren't yours. The wanton gets to act without the illusion and is free from the burden of always having to reflect and fight its instincts. This may be why people often envy their pets that are free of the pressures of the second-order volition and acting truly on instinct. Their pets exercise the ultimate form of free will, which is something people don't get to. 

Work Cited

Frankfurt, Harry G. 1971. “Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person”. The Journal of Philosophy Volume 68 (No. 1): 5-20

Strawson, Galen. 1994. “The Impossibility of Moral Responsibility”. The Journal of Philosophy Volume 75 (No. 1/2): 5-24